Taiyi V0 System Design Goals

Partial Data Commitment: The system is designed to allow buyers to commit to incomplete data at the time of sending the preconf request. For example, user only needs to specify tip amount but not transaction calldata. This intentionally leaves some transaction parameters unspecified until just before the block time, enabling users to make better decisions regarding the transactions they want to send based on the latest EVM state. This flexibility ensures that users can adapt their transactions to the most recent state of the network, maximizing the effectiveness of their transactions.
Proposer Risk Mitigation: The system aims to ensure that validator-proposers bear no risk related to base fees volatility. Since base fees are burned, and the base fee quoted at the time the user sends the preconf may differ from the actual base fee at the time of inclusion, proposers who issue preconf might end up burning more base fees than the premium they originally quoted to the user. To mitigate this risk, the system transfers the risk to more sophisticated parties, delegated preconfirmers, who are better equipped to manage and price the risk accurately. Any base fee related risk is taken on by the delegated preconfirmer.
Fair Exchange Problem: The system is designed to facilitate fair exchange between preconfirmers and users as the equilibrium protocol state without relying on a trusted third party. This means that neither party should be able to intentionally cause harm to the other party. Fair exchange is a challenging problem from a cryptographic perspective. Taiyi addresses this by designing a game that leverages game-theoretical dynamics, incentivizing all parties to behave according to the intended behavior of the protocol. By aligning the interests of all participants, the system ensures that fair exchange is the most beneficial outcome for everyone involved.
Minimal Trust Assumptions: The system aims to avoid introducing additional trusted parties beyond the status quo. It leverages the existing PBS architecture without introducing new trusted components in the transaction pipeline. By relying on the established trust assumptions of the PBS model, the system maintains the security and integrity of the network without requiring users to trust additional entities.
Proposer Agency: The system ensures that proposers have the final say in what to preconfirm and what not to preconfirm. Delegated preconfirmers serve as agents to the proposers, helping to price and manage preconf requests, but their authority is limited to the scope of delegation. Proposers retain ultimate control over the preconfirmation process, allowing them to make decisions based on their own risk assessments and strategic considerations. This autonomy is crucial for maintaining the decentralization and security of the network, as proposers are directly accountable to the consensus mechanism.

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Last updated 9 months ago

Taiyi V0 System Design Goals

Partial Data Commitment: The system is designed to allow buyers to commit to incomplete data at the time of sending the preconf request. For example, user only needs to specify tip amount but not transaction calldata. This intentionally leaves some transaction parameters unspecified until just before the block time, enabling users to make better decisions regarding the transactions they want to send based on the latest EVM state. This flexibility ensures that users can adapt their transactions to the most recent state of the network, maximizing the effectiveness of their transactions.
Proposer Risk Mitigation: The system aims to ensure that validator-proposers bear no risk related to base fees volatility. Since base fees are burned, and the base fee quoted at the time the user sends the preconf may differ from the actual base fee at the time of inclusion, proposers who issue preconf might end up burning more base fees than the premium they originally quoted to the user. To mitigate this risk, the system transfers the risk to more sophisticated parties, delegated preconfirmers, who are better equipped to manage and price the risk accurately. Any base fee related risk is taken on by the delegated preconfirmer.
Fair Exchange Problem: The system is designed to facilitate fair exchange between preconfirmers and users as the equilibrium protocol state without relying on a trusted third party. This means that neither party should be able to intentionally cause harm to the other party. Fair exchange is a challenging problem from a cryptographic perspective. Taiyi addresses this by designing a game that leverages game-theoretical dynamics, incentivizing all parties to behave according to the intended behavior of the protocol. By aligning the interests of all participants, the system ensures that fair exchange is the most beneficial outcome for everyone involved.
Minimal Trust Assumptions: The system aims to avoid introducing additional trusted parties beyond the status quo. It leverages the existing PBS architecture without introducing new trusted components in the transaction pipeline. By relying on the established trust assumptions of the PBS model, the system maintains the security and integrity of the network without requiring users to trust additional entities.
Proposer Agency: The system ensures that proposers have the final say in what to preconfirm and what not to preconfirm. Delegated preconfirmers serve as agents to the proposers, helping to price and manage preconf requests, but their authority is limited to the scope of delegation. Proposers retain ultimate control over the preconfirmation process, allowing them to make decisions based on their own risk assessments and strategic considerations. This autonomy is crucial for maintaining the decentralization and security of the network, as proposers are directly accountable to the consensus mechanism.

PreviousTaiyi System Analysis NextTaiyi V0 Solution

Last updated 9 months ago